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Abstract
This paper assesses the role of sovereign risk in explaining macroeconomic fluctu-
ations in Turkey. We estimate two versions of a simple New Keynesian small open
economy model on quarterly data for the period 1994Q3-2008Q2: A basic version and a
version augmented by a default premium on government debt due to a perceived risk
of sovereign debt default. Model comparisons clearly support the augmented version
since it leads to stronger internal propagation and hence smaller shocks are required in
order to reconcile the observed dynamics of nominal and real variables, leading to better
forecasting performance. The estimated default probability is highly debt-elastic, indi-
cating that default fears are a relevant concern. The results suggest that the augmented
model may lead to a better understanding of macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
market economies that are subject to sovereign risk. In terms of policy implications,
counterfactual experiments show that both more active monetary policy and stronger
fiscal feedbacks from debt on taxes can lead to less volatile inflation and debt dynamics,
but higher debt feedbacks on taxation additionally reduce expected default rates.
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1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of sovereign risk in explaining macroeconomic fluctua-
tions in emerging market economies. While there is a growing empirical literature on new
open-economy macroeconomic (NOEM) models for developed countries (see, for example,
Lubik and Schorfheide, 2005, 2007, or Justiniano and Preston, 2010), the evidence for less
developed countries is still scarce. One possible reason for this lack of studies is that emerg-
ing market economies are often characterized by dynamics of nominal and real variables
that are difficult to reconcile with standard New Keynesian small open economy models.
In particular, many less developed countries are characterized by high inflation rates, high
nominal interest rates and a (perceived) risk of sovereign debt default, combined with the
inability to borrow from abroad in their own currency. Examples are Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, Russia, or Turkey. In the analysis of business cycles in developed economies sovereign
risk is usually neglected. While thismight be a good approximation for developed countries,
sovereign risk may be an important element of business cycles in less developed countries.
We therefore assess the quantitative importance of sovereign risk in explaining the fluctu-
ations of nominal and real variables in Turkey, which is taken as a typical example of an
emerging market economy.
We set up a mostly standard model of a small open economy following Galí and Mona-
celli (2005) but including a fiscal authority. The government borrows in domestic currency
at home and in foreign currency abroad. Rigidities in domestic producer prices are the only
nominal friction. Unlike Galí and Monacelli (2005) we use CPI inflation stabilization as the
central bank’s target which is in line with the actual behavior of the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) (see Ersel and Ozatay, 2008). The government follows a tax rule,
as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), with at least some feedback from higher debt levels
on taxation. Following Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2010), we argue that the feedback
rule may imply perceived infeasible rates of taxation where in such cases the government
defaults on (part of) its outstanding debt. The presence of sovereign default believes leads
to an endogenous default premium on government debt as a function of total real govern-
ment liabilities. If the monetary authority follows an active interest rate policy, increases in
inflation imply high nominal rates and an associated increase in debt service burden which
in turn may lead to higher fears of default. The negative feedback from debt on its return
implies that current savings tends to be lower, putting pressure on the real exchange rate,
further increasing the need for the monetary authority to raise nominal interest rates. This
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destabilizing effect of active monetary policy in the presence of fears of default has been
pointed out by Blanchard (2005) in the context of Brazil.
We outline two variants of the model which differ only with respect to the existence of
the expected default rate in the Euler equation. More specifically, the basic model without
sovereign risk is a special case of the augmented model with sovereign risk but where the
expected default rate in the Euler equation is restricted to equal zero. Then, the model
reduces to a standard New Keynesian small open economy model where the level of debt is
irrelevant for the dynamics of inflation, the nominal interest rate and consumption.
We estimate both versions of the model on quarterly Turkish data for the period 1994Q3-
2008Q2 using Bayesian methods. We find that the estimated expected default rate is highly
debt-elastic, indicating that default fears are a relevant concern. Formal model comparisons
between the two models clearly support the proposed modification of the Euler equation in
the augmented version. We find that in the basic model, large shocks are required in order
to reconcile the observed dynamics of nominal and real variables. In turn, accounting for
sovereign risk leads to stronger internal propagation and better forecasting performance. In
terms of policy implications, counterfactual experiments show that higher fiscal feedbacks
from debt on taxation lead to stable debt and inflation dynamics, by reducing expected de-
fault rates. On the other hand, more active monetary policy is also an effective stabilization
device for inflation and debt, but it does not reduce expected default rates.
Turkey is an illustrative example to study the role of sovereign risk in emerging market
economies. The country was hit by two financial crises in the last decades. The last crisis
burst in November 2000 when interest rates on Turkish government bonds shot up, accom-
panied by a downgrading of Turkey’s debt to below investment grade, indicating that fears
of sovereign default played an important role. This view is supported by several studies
(see Basci and Ekinci, 2005, Aktas, Kaya, and Ozlale, 2005, or Budina and van Wijnbergen,
2008). The presence of sovereign risk and the associated default premia are therefore im-
minent explanations for the observed variations in nominal interest rates on Turkish debt.1
Moreover, good data availability in the case of Turkey, compared to many other emerging
market economies, means that we can estimate the model on a relatively large number of
macroeconomic time series for a relatively long sample.
Our study is related to several strands of literature in addition to the above cited litera-
ture on the estimation of NOEM models. First, several studies explore the role of different
1Recent concerns about fiscal solvency in euro area countries such as Greece, Portugal or Spain suggest that
our results may also have implications for developed economies, both in terms of business cycle analysis and
policy recommendations.
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driving forces of real business cycle in small open economymodels for less developed coun-
tries. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argue that a stochastic productivity trend - rather than
transitory fluctuations around a stable trend - goes a long way towards explaining several
empirical regularities of emerging market economies and in particular the high volatility
of consumption relative to output. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)
show that foreign interest rate shocks amplified by financial frictions (for example working
capital requirements) are consistent with the counter-cyclicality of interest rates and output
in emerging market economies. Chang and Fernández (2010) encompass both approaches
into one model and evaluate the fit of each model using Bayesian methods. Formal model
comparisons attribute a larger role to interest rates and financial frictions in generating ag-
gregate fluctuations as opposed to permanent technology shocks. Our analysis is partly
inspired by this finding on the importance of interest rates in understanding fluctuations in
emerging market economies, but we assess their role in a model with nominal frictions.
Second, models of monetary policy start from the assumption that the central bank con-
trols the short rate as its policy instrument. It is linked to the economy through the con-
sumption Euler equation. Thus, standard New Keynesian models imply that movements
in the short rate are associated one-for-one with movements in the expected growth of the
marginal utility of the representative consumer and expected inflation. However, the em-
pirical shortcomings of the Euler equation have lead researchers to include ad hoc risk-
premium shocks into the Euler equation in both closed and open economy models (see,
for example, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justini-
ano and Preston, 2010). We focus instead on internal propagation mechanisms in order to
improve both the forecasting performance of the current generation of models and their
usefulness for policy analysis.
Third, based on the seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), many papers an-
alyze the role of strategic default of the government and fluctuations in emerging economies.
Most prominently, Arellano (2008) focuses on the terms of international loans which are en-
dogenous to domestic fundamentals and depend on the incentives to default in order to
explain co-movements between real interest rates and output. While this literature focuses
on the strategic incentives for the government to default in order to smooth consumption,
in our model their is no strategic motive for the government which follows a simple fiscal
feedback rule. Default premia are instead determined by investors’ beliefs that infeasible
rates of taxation implied by this rule force the government to default on its debt.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the
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model. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical implementation and in Section 4 we present the
results. In particular, we compare the basic and the augmented model in terms of business
cycle moments, forecasting performance, marginal data densities and variance decompo-
sitions, and we implement counterfactual experiments based on the estimated augmented
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Description
In this section we set up a small open economy model with sticky prices based on Galí and
Monacelli (2005). The model considers expectations about sovereign default, following Sch-
abert and van Wijnbergen (2010). We allow for foreign currency denominated debt in order
to provide a realistic description of the conduct of fiscal policy in Turkey. While the Turkish
government can borrow from domestic households in terms of its own currency, it cannot
borrow from abroad in Turkish lira. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza (2007) call this inability the ‘original sin’ , which typically charac-
terizes emerging market economies. Due to the presence of foreign currency denominated
debt, changes in the real exchange rate have a direct impact on expected sovereign default
rates.
2.1 The public sector
The public sector consists of a government and a central bank. The price of domestic bonds
is set by the central bank, and since government bonds are subject to perceived default
risk, the central bank’s policy instrument is an interest rate on an asset which exhibits a
contingent pay-off. Thus, even if one interprets the policy instrument as a short-term interest
rate, it carries a risk component that will be reflected in equilibrium (see Schabert and van
Wijnbergen, 2006).2
2.1.1 Fiscal policy
The government issues one-period discount bonds denominated in domestic currency BH,t,
which are held by domestic households, and bonds denominated in foreign currency BF,t,
which are held by foreign households.3 It also levies lump-sum taxes Ptτt on domestic
2In fact, in his discussion of Blanchard (2005), Loyo (2005) argues that even an overnight rate (specifically,
the Brazilian Selic) contains a risk premium.
3Throughout, nominal (real) variables are denoted by capital (lower) letters, asterisks denote foreign vari-
ables and variables without time subscript denote non-stochastic steady state values.
5
households and it purchases domestic goods PH,tgt, where Pt and PH,t denote the con-
sumer price level and the price of domestically produced goods, respectively. The assump-
tion that government purchases are fully allocated to domestically produced goods seems
reasonable in view of empirical evidence for OECD countries of a strong home bias in
government procurement, over and above that observed in private consumption (see e.g.
Trionfetti, 2000; Brulhart and Trionfetti, 2004). The central bank sets the domestic currency
price 1/RH,t of domestic bonds, whereas the foreign currency price 1/RF,t of foreign bonds
is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The government is assumed to follow a simple tax feedback rule, adjusting lump-sum
taxes (net of savings of default) in response to the outstanding stock of debt,
Ptτt = κ (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) + Pt exp(ετ,t), ετ,t ∼ NID(0, σ2τ), (1)
where ετ,t is a fiscal policy shock or implementation error in the conduct of policy, and Xt
denotes the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency. Following Bohn (1992),
a tax rule of this type ensures fiscal solvency as long as κ > 0, for any finite initial level of
debt. However, it may imply politically infeasible levels of taxation as discussed next.
2.1.2 Investors’ beliefs
Following Schabert and vanWijnbergen (2010), according to domestic and foreign investors’
beliefs, the government defaults when debt service would demand a politically infeasible
level of taxation T. Lenders do not know the exact value of T, but they have a prior on its
distribution, f (T). Given that tax revenues are set according to (1), the perceived probability
of default δt then equals the probability that the tax rule implies a level of τt exceeding T:
δt =
∫ τt
0
f (T)dT, (2)
where τt = κ (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) /Pt + exp(ετ,t). For a differentiable distribution function
f (·) the impact of total real debt
bt = (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) /Pt = bH,t−1π−1t + qtbF,t−1π
∗−1
t ,
where bt is not predetermined due to the presence of the exchange rate, on the probability
of default is given by
∂δt(·)
∂bt
= κ f (κbt) > 0.
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Thus, the perceived default probability strictly increases with the real value of total debt. For
the local analysis of the model we use the product of the default elasticity with respect to the
real value of total debt evaluated at the steady state with the ratio bH/π1−δ , where δ = δ(b) < 1:
Φ =
bH/π
1− δ
(
∂δt(·)
∂bt
|bt=b
)
. (3)
We refer to Φ as the default elasticity, and we treat it as a structural parameter in the empir-
ical implementation. Note that Φ > 0 if the steady state satisfies bH/π > 0 (see 3).4 This
structure of the default elasticity has broad empirical support; see, for instance, Edwards
(1994), Cantor and Packer (1996), Min (1998), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Ferucci
(2003).
In order to pin down the division of total debt among domestic debt and foreign debt,
which is under the discretion of the government, we assume that the government issues
foreign currency denominated debt as a time-varying fraction ft ≥ 0 of domestic debt:
Xt
BF,t
RF,t
= ft
BH,t
RH,t
,
where ft follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log( ft/ f¯ ) = ρ f log( ft−1/ f¯ ) + ε f ,t, ε f ,t ∼ NID(0, σ
2
f ).
We assume that the savings of default δt (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) are handed out in a lump-
sum fashion to domestic households. Given the specification (2), the period-by-period ex-
pected government budget constraint for any period t reads:
BH,t
RH,t
+ Xt
BF,t
RF,t
+ Ptτt − δt (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1)
= PH,tgt + (1− δt) (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) ,
where gt follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log(gt/g¯) = ρg log(gt−1/g¯) + εg,t, εg,t ∼ NID(0, σ2g).
4Appendix C shows that, while we compute ∂δt(·)∂bt at bt = b, the log-linearization of the model’s equilibrium
conditions and simplification leads to an expression for Φ in terms of bH/π. This expression implies a positive
default premium if the real stock of Turkish lira debt is positive in steady state.
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2.1.3 Monetary policy
The central bank sets the domestic currency price of domestic bonds according to a CPI
based Taylor rule:
RH,t
RH
=
(πt
π
)απ
exp(εR,t), εR,t ∼ NID(0, σ2R), (4)
where the interest rate and inflation targets of the central bank are assumed to be consis-
tent with steady state values. Before the economic reforms introduced in 2001, the central
bank actually followed a crawling peg exchange rate targeting strategy (see Gormez and
Yilmaz, 2007). In order to account for this fact, we check in Section 4.3 the sensitivity of
the estimation results to the introduction of an exchange rate stabilization term in the Tay-
lor rule. Since we are primarily interested in the interaction between an inflation targeting
monetary authority and fiscal policy we do not include the output gap into the Taylor rule.
Moreover, since visual inspection of the data on the nominal interest shows that interest rate
smoothing seemed not to be a primary goal of the CBRT - at least for the first half of the sam-
ple - we do not include a smoothing term into the Taylor rule. Finally, specifying the most
simplest Taylor rule helps achieving better identification of the parameters of interest in the
estimation step by reducing the number of estimated parameters to a necessary minimum.5
Finally, define the nominal rate of depreciation as
πX,t =
Xt
Xt−1
=
(
qt
qt−1
)
πt
π∗t
,
where qt = XtP∗t /Pt denotes the real exchange rate.
2.2 The private sector
2.2.1 Domestic households
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived households, with
identical asset endowments and identical preferences. A representative domestic household
chooses consumption ct, hours worked nt, and the asset portfolio described below, so as to
maximize
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
exp(εc,t)
c1−σt
1− σ
−
n
1+η
t
1+ η
)
, σ > 0, η ≥ 0, (5)
5In Section 4.3 we check the sensitivity of our results to an inclusion of an output gap and smoothing term
into the Taylor rule.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor, σ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption, η denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply and εc,t ∼ NID(0, σ2c ) is a demand shock.
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We assume that domestic households only invest in domestic currency bonds and in a
complete set of state-contingent securities which are traded internationally. Let Γt,t+1 de-
note the stochastic discount factor for a one-period ahead nominal payoff St+1 in foreign
currency. Optimization occurs subject to a no-Ponzi game condition and the perceived flow
budget constraint, which takes into account the households’ default beliefs,
Ptct + Ptτt + Et (XtΓt,t+1St+1) +
BH,t
RH,t
≤ XtSt + (1− δt) BH,t−1 + Ptwtnt + Σt (6)
for given initial wealth endowments BH,−1 and S0. Here, wt is the real wage rate and Σt
collects dividends received from the ownership of firms, which are both taken as given by
the household.
The representative household’s consumption basket is an aggregate of domestically pro-
duced goods cH,t and goods of foreign origin cF,t:
ct = γ (cH,t)
1−ϑ (cF,t)
ϑ ,
where ϑ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the import share and γ =
[
ϑϑ (1− ϑ)
1−ϑ
]−1
. The optimal allocation
of consumption among cH,t and cF,t yields the demand functions
cH,t = (1− ϑ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−1
ct, cF,t = ϑ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−1
ct,
where PH,t and PF,t are the prices of domestic and foreign goods, respectively. The composite
consumption price index (CPI) is
Pt = P
1−ϑ
H,t P
ϑ
F,t. (7)
6We do not specify an AR(1) process for εc,t in order to reduce the amount of exogenous persistence in the
consumption Euler equation (see below).
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The first-order conditions from the maximization of (5) subject to (6) are
λt = exp(εc,t)c−σt (8)
n
η
t = λtwt (9)
λt = RH,tβEt
[
(1− δt+1) λt+1π−1t+1
]
(10)
Γt,t+1 = β
Xt+1λt+1
Xtλt
π−1t+1, (11)
where λt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (6), πt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes the
gross CPI inflation rate. The budget constraint holds with equality and the transversality
conditions are satisfied.
The first equation equates the marginal utility gain of additional consumption and the
shadow price of wealth. The second equation says that the marginal rate of substitution has
to equal the real wage. The last two equations equate the intertemporal terms of trade using
the available assets. Combining (10) and (11), it follows that higher expected default leads
investors to demand a higher interest rate on domestic bonds for a given expected rate of
nominal depreciation and a given stochastic discount factor:
R−1H,t = Et
[
(1− δt+1)π−1X,t+1Γt,t+1
]
.
2.2.2 Foreign households
The foreign economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived households with iden-
tical asset endowments, which have qualitatively the same preferences as domestic house-
holds. A representative foreign household’s demand for domestically produced consump-
tion goods c∗H,t satisfies
c∗H,t = ϑ
∗
(
P∗H,t
P∗t
)−1
c∗t , (12)
where ϑ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and c∗t is aggregate foreign consumption. The foreign households invest
in state-contingent securities St and foreign currency denominated bonds issued by the do-
mestic government BF,t. The first order conditions are given by
Γt,t+1 = β
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
π∗−1t+1 (13)
λ∗t = RF,tβEt
[
(1− δt+1) λ∗t+1π
∗−1
t+1
]
, (14)
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where λ∗t = c
∗−σ
t . Note that (13) (together with 11) allows perfect international risk sharing
(see below). Since the foreign economy is exogenous to the domestic economy, we assume
for simplicity that foreign consumption and foreign inflation are determined according to
an (identified) vector autoregression of order 4, specified in logs (see Section 3.3).
2.2.3 Final goods producers
The final domestic good yH,t is assembled by a perfectly competitive final goods sector from
intermediate goods yiH,t, for i ∈ [0, 1], through the technology
yH,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
yiH,t
) ǫ−1
ǫ
di
) ǫ
ǫ−1
,
where ǫ denotes the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The final goods producer maximizes profits over input demands taking as given all in-
termediate goods prices PiH,t and the final goods price PH,t:
max
yiH,t
PH,tyH,t −
∫ 1
0
PiH,ty
i
H,tdi
which yields the input demand functions
yiH,t =
(
PiH,t
PH,t
)−ǫ
yH,t for all i, (15)
where we have used the zero profit condition in the final goods sector, i.e. PH,tyH,t =∫ 1
0 P
i
H,ty
i
H,tdi.
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The price index for domestic goods PH,t follows from substituting (15) into the zero profit
condition stated above:
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
PiH,t
)1−ǫ
di
) 1
1−ǫ
.
7The first-order conditions corresponding to the solution of the final goods producer’s profit maximization
problem are
PiH,t = PH,t
(
yiH,t
) ǫ−1
ǫ −1
(∫ 1
0
(
yiH,t
) ǫ−1
ǫ
di
) ǫ
ǫ−1−1
for all i.
Dividing the first-order conditions for two types of goods i and j by each other gives
PiH,ty
i
H,t = P
j
H,t
(
y
j
H,t
) 1
ǫ
(
yiH,t
) ǫ−1
ǫ .
Integrating over all intermediate goods yields∫ 1
0
PiH,ty
i
H,tdi = P
j
H,t
(
y
j
H,t
) 1
ǫ
y
ǫ−1
ǫ
H,t = PH,tyH,t,
where the last equality follows from the zero profit condition.
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2.2.4 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods production is done by a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms. Each firm i uses the technology
yiH,t = atn
i
t,
where at is common factor productivity which follows an AR(1) process in logs
log at = ρa log at−1 + εa,t, εa,t ∼ NID(0, σ2a ).
Intermediate goods producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, taking the
input price wt as given, firms hire labor in order to minimize costs independently of the
output price PiH,t:
min
nit
Ptwtn
i
t s.t. y
i
H,t = atn
i
t.
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are
Ptwt = MC
i
tat for all i,
where MCit denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the technology constraint,
i.e. nominal marginal costs. Marginal costs are seen to be common across domestic firms,
MCit = MCt, since all firms face the same input prices and use the same technology. Ex-
pressing real marginal costs in terms of domestic prices, mct = MCt/PH,t, then yields the
labor demand function
wt =
PH,t
Pt
mctat,
In the second stage of the intermediate goods producers’ problem, given real marginal
costs, they choose prices PiH,t in order to maximize discounted real profits. Following Calvo
(1983) and Yun (1996), in each period a fraction 1− φ of randomly selected firms is allowed
to set a new price PˇiH,t = PˇH,t, by symmetry. The remaining firms change their prices along
with steady state producer price inflation πH. Each firm i which receives permission to
optimally reset its price maximizes the expected sum of discounted profits subject to the
12
demand function (15):
max Et
∞
∑
s=0
φsXtΓt,t+s
[
PiH,t − PH,t+smct+s
]
yiH,t+s
s.t. yiH,t =
(
PiH,t+s
PH,t+s
)−ǫ
yH,t+s,
where PiH,t+s = PˇH,tπ
s
H for s = 1, 2, . . .
The first-order condition is
0 = Et
∞
∑
s=0
φsXtΓt,t+sy
i
H,t+s
[
(1− ǫ)πsH PˇH,t + ǫPH,t+smct+s
]
.
The price index of domestic goods follows as
PH,t =
[
(1− φ) Pˇ
1−ǫ
H,t + φ (πHPH,t−1)
1−ǫ
] 1
1−ǫ
.
2.3 Market clearing
Market clearing requires that the demand for labor services is equal to labor supply:
∫ 1
0
nitdi = nt.
Integrating yiH,t = atn
i
t over all i, it then follows that
∫ 1
0
yiH,tdi = atnt
or, using the demand functions (15):
yH,tvt = atnt,
where vt =
∫ 1
0
(
PiH,t
PH,t
)−ǫ
di is a price dispersion term.
We assume the domestic economy to be small relative to the foreign economy, implying
that the foreign producer price level P∗F,t is identical to the foreign consumption price index
P∗t . Furthermore, the law of one price is assumed to hold separately for each good such
that PF,t = XtP∗F,t and PH,t = XtP
∗
H,t, where P
∗
H,t is the price of domestic goods expressed in
foreign currency. Using (7), foreign demand for domestic goods (12) can then be re-written
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as
c∗H,t = ϑ
∗q
1
1−ϑ
t c
∗
t
and domestic demand cH,t = (1− ϑ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−1
ct can be re-written as
cH,t = (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ
t ct,
where we have used that PH,tPt =
(
PF,t
Pt
)− ϑ1−ϑ
=
(
XtP
∗
t
Pt
)− ϑ1−ϑ
= q
− ϑ1−ϑ
t .
Goods market clearing requires that aggregate supply equals aggregate demand:
yH,t = cH,t + c
∗
H,t + gt.
Using the demand functions, the goods market clearing condition can be re-written as
yH,t = (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ
t ct + ϑ
∗q
1
1−ϑ
t c
∗
t + gt.
Further, the CPI inflation rate can be expressed in terms of producer price inflation as fol-
lows:
πt = πH,t(qt/qt−1)
ϑ
1−ϑ for all t ≥ 1.
Combining (11) and (13) yields
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
=
qt+1
qt
λt+1
λt
.
This condition determines the relation between the levels of domestic and foreign marginal
utility and the real exchange rate up to a constant ξ (which depends on initial endowments):
λ∗t = ξqtλt.
2.4 Log-linearized equilibrium
For the empirical implementation we employ a log-linear approximation to the model’s
equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. The latter is described in
Appendix B. Thus, define the log deviation of a variable xt from its steady state x as xˆt ≡
log(xt/x) ≈ (xt − x)/x, such that 100× xˆt is approximately the percentage deviation of xt
from x. Furthermore, we denote as x˜t = xxˆt the absolute deviation of xt from x. Using
these relations, the following log-linearized system of equilibrium equations is derived in
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Appendix C.8
Domestic households.
λˆt = εc,t − σcˆt (16)
ηnˆt = λˆt + wˆt (17)
Foreign households.
λˆ∗t = −σcˆ
∗
t (18)
Production and pricing.
yˆH,t = aˆt + nˆt (19)
m̂ct =
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt + wˆt − aˆt (20)
πˆH,t =
(1− φ) (1− φβ)
φ
m̂ct + βEtπˆH,t+1 (21)
πˆt = πˆH,t +
ϑ
1− ϑ
(qˆt − qˆt−1) (22)
Capital market.
λˆ∗t = qˆt + λˆt (23)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + RH,t − Etπˆt+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Etδ˜t+1 (24)
λˆ∗t = Etλˆ
∗
t+1 + RˆF,t − Etπˆ
∗
t+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Etδ˜t+1 (25)
Etδ˜t+1 = Φ
(
1− δ¯
) (
1+ f¯
)
Etbˆt+1 (26)
8Variables with bars denote steady state values which we take as given.
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Policy.
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t = fˆt + bˆH,t − RˆH,t (27)(
1+ f¯
)
bˆt = bˆH,t−1 − πˆt + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)
(28)
bˆH,t − RˆH,t + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t
)
=
(1− κ)(1+ f¯ )
β
(
1− δ¯
) bˆt − ετ,t
+
κ + β
(
1− δ¯
)
− 1
β
(
1− δ¯
)
(1+ f¯ )−1
(
gˆt −
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt
)
(29)
RˆH,t = αππˆt + εR,t (30)
Market clearing.
yˆH,t = (1− ϑ) s¯c cˆt +
[
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
]
cˆ∗t
+
(
ϑs¯c +
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
1− ϑ
)
qˆt + s¯g gˆt (31)
Stochastic processes.
aˆt = ρa aˆt−1 + εa,t (32)
gˆt = ρg gˆt−1 + εg,t (33)
fˆt = ρ f fˆt−1 + ε f ,t (34)
ρcc0∗ cˆ
∗
t = ρ
cc
1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
cπ
1∗ πˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
cc
2∗ cˆ
∗
t−2 + ρ
cπ
2∗ πˆ
∗
t−2
+ ρcc3∗ cˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
cπ
3∗ πˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
cc
4∗ cˆ
∗
t−4 + ρ
cπ
4∗ πˆ
∗
t−4 + εc∗,t (35)
ρππ0∗ πˆ
∗
t + ρ
πc
0∗ cˆ
∗
t = ρ
ππ
1∗ πˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
πc
1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
ππ
2∗ πˆ
∗
t−2 + ρ
πc
2∗ cˆ
∗
t−2
+ ρππ3∗ πˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
πc
3∗ cˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
ππ
4∗ πˆ
∗
t−4 + ρ
πc
4∗ cˆ
∗
t−4 + επ∗,t (36)
We then have the following definition: A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences
{cˆt, cˆ∗t , λˆt, λˆ
∗
t , nˆt, wˆt, aˆt, yˆH,t, m̂ct, qˆt, πˆH,t, πˆt, πˆ
∗
t , bˆt, bˆH,t, bˆF,t, fˆt, gˆt,, RˆH,t, RˆF,t, δ˜t}
∞
t=0 satisfying (16)-
(36) and the transversality conditions, for given initial asset endowments BH,−1 and BF,−1 and initial
price levels PH,−1 and PF,−1. The i.i.d. innovations are {εa,t, εc,t, ε f ,t, εg,t, εR,t, ετ,t, εc∗,t, επ∗,t}∞t=0.
3 Empirical Implementation
The linearizedmodel is estimated using Bayesianmethods as described inAn and Schorfheide
(2007).9 We apply full information estimation techniques since they provide a natural frame-
9We use version 4.1.1 of the Dynare toolbox for MATLAB for the computations.
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work for formal model comparisons. To our knowledge, this is the first study which esti-
mates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for Turkey. As a consequence we
hardly have access to prior information on the model’s deep structural parameters. There-
fore, we use uniform priors for those parameters as wewouldwith restrictedmaximum like-
lihood estimation. However, the standard deviations of the shocks turned out to be weakly
identified especially for the model without default risk, which may be a consequence of pos-
sible model misspecification. In order to avoid implausible estimates for those parameters,
we elicit (diffuse) priors centered on values which we deem reasonable, as described below.
3.1 Econometric methodology
Formally, let P(θMi |Mi) denote the prior distribution of the vector of structural parameters
θMi for model Mi, and let L(Y
T|θMi ,Mi) denote the likelihood function for the observed data
YT = Y1, . . . ,YT. Collect the model variables in the vector xt, and let εt and ζt denote the
vectors of structural shocks and expectational errors, respectively. The log-linearized model
Axt = Bxt−1 + Cεt + Dζt
is solved using standard perturbation techniques, which yields as solution the linear state-
space representation
xt = Fxt−1 + Gεt, εt ∼ NID(0,Σε)
Yt = Hxt + ut, ut ∼ NID(0,Σu)
for t = 1, . . . , T. The first equation is the state transition equation and the second equation
is the observation equation with measurement errors collected in ut.
The Kalman filter is applied to evaluate the likelihood of the observables.10 The posterior
distribution of the vector of parameters is obtained using Bayes’ rule:
P(θMi |Y
T,Mi) =
L(YT|θMi ,Mi)P(θMi |Mi)∫
L(YT|θMi ,Mi)P(θMi |Mi)dθMi
∝ L(YT|θMi ,Mi)P(θMi |Mi).
In order to evaluate the posterior, the Random Walk Metropolis (RWM) algorithm is used.
In short, this algorithm constructs a Gaussian approximation around the mode of the poste-
rior kernel L(YT|θMi ,Mi)P(θMi |Mi) and uses a scaled version of the asymptotic covariance
10Since xt is stationary, the Kalman filter is initialized with the unconditional distribution of xt.
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matrix as the covariance matrix for a proposal distribution.11 Using rejection sampling, the
algorithm then generates a sequence of draws from the posterior that can be averaged to
approximate posterior moments of interest, such as location measures and measures of dis-
persion.12
We assess the evidence of model Mi over an alternative model Mj using posterior odds
comparison. The ratio of the posterior probabilities of the two models is
P(Mi|Y
T)
P(Mj|YT)
=
P(Mi)
P(Mj)
p(YT|Mi)
p(YT|Mj)
.
The first term on the right-hand side is the prior odds ratio in favor of model Mi. The second
term is the Bayes factor summarizing the sample evidence in favor of model Mi. Here, the
marginal data density p(YT|Mi) ≡
∫
L(YT|θMi ,Mi)P(θMi |Mi)dθMi indicates the likelihood
of model Mi conditional on the observed data, and similarly for model Mj.13 Throughout
the analysis, we set the prior odds ratio to 1.
Finally, for t = 1, . . . , T the smoothed structural shocks εt|T which, according to the
model, have generated the observed data are recovered by an application of the Kalman fil-
ter at the posterior mean estimates of the model parameters. This step also yields smoothed
estimates xt|T of the (unobserved) model variables. In order to evaluate the forecasting per-
formance of alternative models, one-step ahead forecasts are computed as the estimates of
the observed variables conditional on period t information: Yt+1|t = Hxt+1|t, where xt+1|t is
computed as xt+1|t = Fxt|t and xt|t denotes the updated variables obtained from the appli-
cation of the Kalman filter.
11The (log) posterior kernel is maximized using Chris Sim’s version of the BFGS quasi-Newton algorithm,
which uses a line search and randomly perturbs the search direction if it reaches regions of non-existence or
non-uniqueness of a stable rational expectations solution.
12Let Σ˜Mi denote the negate inverse Hessian at the posterior mode θ˜Mi . A starting value θ
(0)
Mi
is drawn from
N(θ˜Mi , c0Σ˜Mi ). For s = 1, . . . , S, a candidate vector θ˘Mi is drawn from the proposal distribution N(θ
(s)
Mi
, cΣ˜Mi ).
The jump from θ(s−1)Mi is accepted (θ
(s)
Mi
= θ˘Mi ) with probability min{1, r(θ
(s−1)
Mi
, θ˘|YT)} and rejected (θ(s)Mi =
θ
(s−1)
Mi
) otherwise, where
r(θ
(s−1)
Mi
, θ˘|YT) =
L(YT |θ˘Mi ,Mi)P(θ˘Mi |Mi)
L(YT |θ
(s−1)
Mi
,Mi)P(θ
(s−1)
Mi
|Mi)
In practice, we use S = 500, 000 and drop the first 250, 000 draws to let the Markov chain produced by the RWM
algorithm converge. The scaling factor c0 is set to 2c, and we produce five chains with different starting values
in order to assess convergence based on the diagnostics suggested by Brooks and Gelman’s (1998). The scaling
factor c is set in order to achieve an average acceptance rate per chain of approximately 25%.
13The marginal data density is estimated using Geweke’s (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator.
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3.2 Data description
We use quarterly data on real Turkish output (GDPt), real private consumption (CONSt), the
annual consumer price inflation rate (INFt), the nominal interest rate on 3-month Turkish lira
denominated treasury bills (INTt), the real effective exchange rate (REERt), real government
consumption (GOVt), real Turkish lira denominated domestic government debt (DEBTt),
real foreign consumption (CONS∗t ) and the foreign consumer price inflation rate (INF
∗
t ).
The variables of the foreign economy (CONS∗t and INF
∗
t ) are computed as a trade-weighted
average of the U.S. and the Euro area, which are Turkey’s main trading partners.14
The sample period is 1994:3-2008:2 (T = 56 observations). The starting point is chosen
to reduce the impact of high inflation during the crisis period in the first two quarters of
1994. In these quarters, annual inflation rates reached values up to 150 percent but they
returned to about 60 percent in the third quarter of 1994. The annual interest rate was almost
300 percent in 1994:2 but it returned to around 122 percent in 1994:3. Although such high
inflation and interest rates could potentially be explained by large shocks, it seems unlikely
that our assumptions on the statistical properties of the stochastic processes such as their
AR(1) structure and normality of the disturbances, which we make to simplify econometric
inference, are adequate to describe such crisis episodes.
Nominal variables are demeaned consistent with their steady state values. Real variables
are in natural logarithms and they are detrended using a linear trend, since our model does
not explicitly consider growth.15 Details on data definitions and the construction of the
foreign variables are provided in Appendix A. Domestic and foreign inflation (INFt and
INF∗t ) and the domestic interest rate (INTt) are related to the model variables through the
measurement equations
INFt = 4π¯πˆt
INF∗t = 4π¯
∗πˆ∗t
INTt = 4R¯H RˆH,t.
Furthermore, since the available data for the real effective exchange rate REERt is con-
14We include domestic currency denominated debt as an observed variable since Turkey issues external (U.S.
dollar and Euro denominated) debt only at maturities longer than 3 months. In addition, the observed nominal
interest rate also refers to domestic currency denominated debt.
15We have verified that our results are robust to the use of alternative trends, such as linear-quadratic or
Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends, by estimating the basic and the augmented model on the alternatively de-
trended data. The estimates of the model’s deep structural parameters are similar to the ones obtained with a
linear trend, while the estimated shock variances tend to decrease.
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structed as a trade-weighted average of all trading partners of Turkey it is not exactly equiv-
alent to the model-implied real exchange rate, given that we construct the foreign variables
CONS∗t and INF
∗
t as a trade-weighted average of the U.S. and the Euro area. Thus, we in-
clude an error in the measurement equation for the real exchange rate:
REERt = qˆt + uq,t,
where uq,t ∼ NID(0, σ2q ). The remaining observed variables are equal to the model vari-
ables, i.e. GDPt = yˆH,t, CONSt = cˆt, GOVt = gˆt, DEBTt = bˆH,t and CONS∗t = cˆ
∗
t . All
observed variables are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Data used in the estimation. Notes. Quarterly data, 1994:3-2008:2; real variables
are measured in percentage deviations from a linear trend, nominal variables are demeaned
and in annualized percentage terms.
3.3 Calibrated parameters
The steady state values are calibrated consistent with sample averages. The average annual
Turkish inflation rate over the period 1994:3-2008:2 was 37.2 percent. In order to match this
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value, we set the quarterly steady state inflation rate to π = π¯ = 1.093. The average an-
nualized 3-month treasury bill rate was approximately 72.4 percent, so we set the quarterly
steady state interest rate to RH = R¯H = 1.181. Further, we set the shares of private and gov-
ernment consumption in GDP sc and sg, respectively, to their empirical counterparts. That
is, sc = s¯c = 0.683 and sg = s¯g = 0.108. The steady state share of foreign currency denomi-
nated debt over domestic currency denominated debt is also set to its empirical counterpart,
i.e. f = f¯ = 0.829.
The parameters of the stochastic process for the foreign variables are calibrated by fitting
an identified VAR(4) process to detrended (log) real foreign consumption and the demeaned
annual foreign inflation rate:
 log c∗t
logπ∗t
 = (I −Φ1∗ −Φ2∗ −Φ3∗ −Φ4∗)
 log c¯∗
log π¯∗
+ Φ1∗
 log c∗t−1
logπ∗t−1

+Φ2∗
 log c∗t−2
logπ∗t−2
+ Φ3∗
 log c∗t−3
logπ∗t−3
+ Φ4∗
 log c∗t−4
logπ∗t−4
+
 vc∗,t
vπ∗,t
 ,
where [vc∗,t, vπ∗,t]
′ ∼ NID(0,Σ∗). Our identifying assumption is that foreign consumption
affects foreign inflation within a quarter but not vice versa. We apply a recursive Cholesky
identification scheme: Σ∗ = C∗C′∗, where C∗ is a non-singular lower triangularmatrix, which
yields the structural shocks [εc∗,t, επ∗,t]
′ ∼ NID(0, I) as a linear combination of the reduced-
form innovations, i.e. [εc∗,t, επ∗,t]
′ = C−1∗ [vc∗,t, vπ∗,t]
′.
We calibrate steady state foreign inflation π∗ = π¯∗ to match an average quarterly foreign
inflation rate of 0.6 percent over the period 1994:3-2008:2, or an average annual inflation rate
of 2.4 percent. Foreign consumption and inflation are then included in the actual estimation
step (calibrating the VAR parameters) in order to recover the shocks of foreign origin.
We also calibrate a small number of additional parameters that are inherently difficult to
identify. This concerns the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η which we set to
2, implying a labor supply elasticity of 1/2 in line with the range of available estimates (see
Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne, 2008). The subjective discount factor β is set to 0.99, which
implies a steady state default probability δ = δ¯ = 1 − π¯/R¯H/β = 0.065, in accordance
with the average EMBIG spread on Turkish governments bonds over the sample period.16
Furthermore, the foreign degree of openness towards the domestic economy ϑ∗ is set to
0.004, which is approximately equal to the weighted average, according to the trade weights
16In Section 4.3 we check the sensitivity of our results to alternative values for β.
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used to construct foreign variables, of the shares of imports from Turkey in GDP of the Euro
area and the U.S.17
3.4 Prior distributions
Our priors are summarized in Table 1. The prior distributions are assumed to be indepen-
dent across parameters. We elicit uniform priors, restricted to theoretically plausible ranges,
on all deep structural parameters. In particular, the inverse elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution σ and the inflation feedback in the Taylor rule απ obtain a lower bound of 0 and
upper bounds of 20 and 10, respectively. The Calvo probability φ and the domestic degree
of openness ϑ are restricted to the range [0,1], consistent with their theoretically feasible val-
ues. In order to ensure a positive default elasticity, which is the case if steady state domestic
debt is positive, the debt response κ in the fiscal policy rule is restricted to be larger than
1− β(1− δ¯), and we impose an upper bound of 10.18
We also use uniform priors on the range [0,1] for the AR(1) coefficients of the stochas-
tic processes. However, as discussed above, in order to rule out implausible estimates for
the standard deviations of the innovation components for any version of the model, we im-
pose tighter priors on those parameters. That is, we elicit inverse gamma priors with mean
0.05 and an infinite standard deviation, implying that a larger portion of the probability
mass tends to fall on existing estimates for small open economies (see e.g. Adolfson, Laséen,
Lindé, and Villani, 2007; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007; Justiniano and Preston, 2008) while
still covering all of the theoretically feasible range.
17This weighted average is calculated as follows, taking as reference year the year 2007 due to data availabil-
ity. The main Turkish exports markets in 2007 were the European Union (56.4%), Russia (4.4%), the U.S. (3.9%),
Romania (3.4%), the United Arab Emirates (3.0%) and Iraq (2.6%) (see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/turkey). The total goods exports volume of Turkey was approxi-
mately 107.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2007 (see the country statistical profile for Turkey on http://stats.oecd.org).
Total nominal U.S. private consumption in 2007 was 39,752.5 billion U.S. dollars, such that the share of imports
from Turkey in U.S. private consumption can be calculated as ϑUS = 0.039×107.239752.5 ≃ 0.000105 = 0.0105%. Simi-
larly, total nominal Euro area private consumption in 2007was 5,058.8 billion Euros, or 6,922.7 billionU.S. dollars
given an average Euro per U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate of 0.731 in 2007. The share of imports from Turkey
in Euro area private consumption can thus be calculated as ϑEA = 0.564×107.26922.7 ≃ 0.008734 = 0.8734%. Hence, we
obtain the foreign degree of openness towards the domestic economy as ϑ∗ = µ
EAϑEA+µUSϑUS
µEA+µUS
≃ 0.003858, where
the weights are µEA = 0.77 and µUS = 1 (see Appendix A).
18Note that bHπ =
g(1+ f¯ )−1
κ+β(1−δ)−1 as shown in Appendix C, and therefore Φ > 0 when
bH
π > 0, which is the case if
κ > 1− β(1− δ¯) since g, f¯ > 0.
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Table 1: Prior distributions and posterior estimates.a
With sovereign risk (M1) No sovereign risk (M2)
Parameter Definition Domain Priorb Post. mean 90% int. Post. mean 90% int.
σ Inv. elast. of intertemp. subst. R+ U(0, 20) 0.59 [0.44, 0.75] 15.85 [13.82, 17.84]
φ Calvo price stickiness [0,1] U(0, 1) 0.19 [0.00, 0.33] 0.72 [0.67, 0.78]
ϑ Degree of openness [0,1] U(0, 1) 0.42 [0.29, 0.54] 0.03 [0.00, 0.05]
απ Taylor rule inflation response R U(0, 10) 2.10 [1.81, 2.40] 1.25 [1.16, 1.33]
κ Tax rule debt response R U(κL, 10)c 0.53 [0.46, 0.60] 0.10 [0.08, 0.11]
Φ Default elasticity R+ U(0, 10) 0.25 [0.21, 0.28] – –
ρa AR(1) technology [0,1) U(0, 1) 0.91 [0.84, 0.99] 0.64 [0.54, 0.74]
ρg AR(1) gov. consumption [0,1) U(0, 1) 0.50 [0.32, 0.67] 0.79 [0.71, 0.88]
ρ f AR(1) foreign debt ratio [0,1) U(0, 1) 0.86 [0.77, 0.96] 0.66 [0.24, 1.00]
σa Std. dev. technology shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.02 [0.02, 0.03] 0.06 [0.03, 0.08]
σg Std. dev. gov. consumption shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.04 [0.03, 0.05] 0.23 [0.18, 0.27]
σf Std. dev. foreign debt ratio shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.31 [0.26, 0.36] 0.04 [0.01, 0.09]
στ Std. dev. fiscal policy shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.10 [0.08, 0.13] 0.12 [0.09, 0.16]
σR Std. dev. interest rate shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.07 [0.06, 0.08] 0.06 [0.05, 0.07]
σc Std. dev. demand shocks R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.02 [0.01, 0.02] 0.83 [0.67, 0.99]
σq Std. dev. meas. error on REERt R+ IG(0.05,∞) 0.09 [0.08, 0.10] 0.21 [0.17, 0.25]
log p(YT|Mi) Log marginal data densityd 873.67 704.64
a The estimation results are based on 500,000 accepted draws from the RWM sampler, dropping the first 250,000 draws.
b U(a, b) refers to the continuous uniform distribution with lower bound a and upper bound b; IG(c, d) refers to the inverse gamma distribution with mean c and
std. deviation d.
c The lower bound is κL = 1− β(1− δ¯), which ensures that steady state domestic debt bH/π is positive such that Φ > 0 (see Appendix C).
d The marginal data density is estimated using Geweke’s (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator.
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4 Estimation Results
We organize the discussion of results as follows. Section 4.1 compares the basic model with-
out perceived default risk and the augmented model in terms of parameter estimates, poste-
rior odds comparisons, model-implied shocks, business cycle moments, forecasting perfor-
mance, and variance decompositions. Section 4.2 implements several counterfactual exper-
iments based on the estimated model, in order to understand the role of perceived default
risk and to assess policy implications and presents estimated impulse responses. Robustness
checks are deferred to Section 4.3.
4.1 Model comparison: Basic vs. augmented model
4.1.1 Parameter estimates and marginal data densities
The estimation results for both the basic and the augmented model are summarized in Table
1. The table reports the posterior means of the estimated parameters, their 90% probabil-
ity intervals and the (log) marginal data densities associated with the two models. Several
results stand out. The estimated deep structural parameters, inverse intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity σ, price stickiness φ and degree of openness ϑ, are broadly in line with existing
estimates for small open economies (see, for example Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007; Justini-
ano and Preston, 2008) but, most notably, the model without sovereign risk implies a signif-
icantly higher σ. We provide an interpretation of this result below.
The estimated default elasticity Φ in the model with sovereign risk is 0.25, such that
the expected default rate is highly debt-elastic. This result confirms the findings in Budina
and van Wijnbergen (2008) who show that higher debt service obligations lead to stronger
expectations that these debt obligations might not be met. Furthermore, both the Taylor
rule inflation response απ and the tax feedback κ are larger in the model with sovereign
risk but in line with existing estimates (see Yazgan and Yilmazkuday, 2007). All three policy
parameters are well identified. The fact that a positive default elasticity implies a relatively
high tax feedback is not surprising, since this is required – by prior assumption – in order to
prevent the unstable equilibrium dynamics suggested by Blanchard (2005) and analyzed in
Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2010).
Third, the standard deviations of the structural innovations are significantly larger in the
basic model, whereas the model with sovereign risk requires much smaller shocks in order
to describe the data. An exception is the standard deviation of the foreign debt share, which
is however not well identified in the model without sovereign risk. The remaining standard
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deviations are also better identified in the model with sovereign risk. A formal model com-
parison based on the marginal data density clearly supports the model with sovereign risk.
The Bayes factor in favor of this model (M1) over the model without sovereign risk (M2) is
p(YT|M1)
p(YT|M2)
=
exp(873.67)
exp(704.64)
≈ 2.6× 1073
indicating strong support for the model with sovereign risk, conditional on the observed
data.
4.1.2 Estimated default rate and EMBIG spreads
How do the size and dynamics of the estimated expected default rate compare to existing
estimates of sovereign risk in Turkey? Figure 2 plots the expected default rate Etδ˜t+1, as
implied by the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean, against the J.P. Morgan Emerging
Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) spreads on (i) Turkish bonds denominated in U.S. dollar
over U.S. treasury bonds and (ii) Euro denominated Turkish bonds over German bunds.19
In general there is a strong co-movement, although the EMBIG indicates somewhat smaller
default rates before and during the 2000-2001 crisis and larger rates thereafter. The corre-
lations between the model-implied expected default rate and (i) and (ii) are 0.66 and 0.56,
respectively. Given the degree of abstraction of the theoretical model, based on this evi-
dence one may nevertheless conclude that it provides a realistic description of sovereign
risk in Turkey.
4.1.3 Business cycle moments
In order to provide a first intuition on the factors underlying the support for the model with
sovereign risk, we discuss the business cycle implications of the two estimated models in
terms of selected moments. Table 2 compares the standard deviations, correlations with
output and autocorrelations of the observed data with the corresponding model-implied
moments. These moments are computed at the posterior mean conditional on all structural
shocks. The results show that the basic model overpredicts the volatility of domestic output,
the real exchange rate and the fiscal variables but significantly underpredicts the volatility
of inflation (by a factor of 26) and the nominal interest rate. The model with sovereign risk
comes closer in terms of the volatility of output, the real exchange rate and also inflation.
19All variables are reported in basis points, and the steady state value δ¯ is added to the estimated default rate
in absolute deviations from steady state, Et δ˜t+1, in order to obtain the actual estimated default rate Etδt+1.
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Figure 2: Estimated expected default rate (Etδ˜t+1) and J.P. Morgan EMBIG Turkey spreads.
Notes. The default rate is the estimate implied by the Kalman smoother at the posterior
mean (1994:3-2008:2); source of EMBIG spreads (monthly data): J.P. Morgan and Bloomberg;
‘USD’ indicates spreads on U.S. dollar Brady bonds and loans over U.S. treasury bonds
(08/1998-06/2008); ‘Euro’ indicates spreads on euro denominated bonds and loans over
German bunds (05/1999-06/2008).
It overstates the latter, but only by a factor of 2.5. In sum, the augmented model tends to
overpredict the variability of nominal variables and debt. We provide a discussion on this
in Section 4.2. When comparing the relative volatility of the components of output, the
next two columns of Table 2 show that the augmented model also more closely matches the
relative volatility of domestic private and government consumption relative to output.
Both versions of the model have trouble in matching the observed correlations with do-
mestic output, but it stands out that the cyclicality of domestic consumption is significantly
understated by the basic model whereas the augmented model implies a perfect match.
Also in terms of autocorrelation patterns, the model with sovereign risk implies a better fit
although there are some exceptions such as the real exchange rate. Most notably, however,
the autocorrelations of domestic output and consumption are matched significantly more
closely by the augmented model. Overall, we conclude that the proposed modification of
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Table 2: Selected moments of observed data and model-implied moments.a
Standard Std. deviation Correlation Autocorrelation Autocorrelation
deviation rel. to output with output of order 1 of order 4
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
With sovereign risk
Output 0.05 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.61 0.68
Consumption 0.05 0.06 0.97 1.02 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.78 0.55 0.59
Inflation 0.26 0.64 – – 0.04 -0.39 0.90 0.93 0.76 0.81
Interest rate 0.52 1.42 – – 0.05 -0.40 0.79 0.96 0.71 0.84
Real exch. rate 0.08 0.10 – – -0.41 0.31 0.71 0.11 -0.02 0.09
Gov. consumption 0.05 0.05 0.89 0.80 0.58 0.03 0.60 0.50 0.23 0.06
Domestic debt 0.19 0.57 – – -0.76 -0.33 0.94 0.94 0.58 0.77
For. consumption 0.01 0.03 0.26 0.52 -0.60 0.04 0.97 0.99 0.75 0.87
For. inflation 0.01 0.01 – – 0.11 -0.39 0.17 0.26 -0.06 0.03
Default rate – 0.15 – – – -0.35 – 0.96 – 0.84
No sovereign risk
Output 0.05 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.76 0.61 0.60
Consumption 0.05 0.05 0.97 0.65 0.94 0.26 0.86 0.04 0.55 0.03
Inflation 0.26 0.01 – – 0.04 0.63 0.90 0.83 0.76 0.57
Interest rate 0.52 0.43 – – 0.05 0.41 0.79 0.61 0.71 0.42
Real exch. rate 0.08 0.38 – – -0.41 0.65 0.71 0.66 -0.02 0.57
Gov. consumption 0.05 0.37 0.89 4.50 0.58 0.37 0.60 0.79 0.23 0.40
Domestic debt 0.19 0.44 – – -0.76 0.12 0.94 0.98 0.58 0.93
For. consumption 0.01 0.03 0.26 0.35 -0.60 -0.77 0.97 0.99 0.75 0.87
For. inflation 0.01 0.01 – – 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.26 -0.06 0.03
a The model-implied moments are computed from the solution of the model at the posterior mean.
b The standard deviations of inflation and the interest rate are in annual terms, the remaining standard deviations are in quarterly terms.
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the basic model leads to a better description of the observed data in terms of business cycle
facts.
4.1.4 Model-implied shocks
Next, in order to illustrate the differences in terms of the size of shocks required to fit the
data, Figure 3 shows the estimated structural innovations implied by the Kalman smoother
at the posterior mean according to both model versions. The model without sovereign risk
generates much larger domestic demand shocks and government consumption shocks, and
also larger technology shocks and measurement errors on the real exchange rate. Overall,
the model with sovereign risk requires significantly smaller shocks. An exception is the
foreign debt ratio. Importantly, the estimated innovations from themodel without sovereign
risk can hardly be defended to satisfy the properties of the assumed underlying stochastic
processes, i.e. no autocorrelation.20 The model with sovereign risk, on the other hand,
comes closer to those assumptions except for occasional spikes during the financial crisis of
2000-2001.
4.1.5 Forecasting performance
Figure 4 compares the observed variables and their one-step ahead forecasts implied by
the two estimated models. The one-step ahead forecasts are computed by applying the
Kalman filter at the respective posterior mean estimates. From visual inspection, while both
models forecast output, inflation and government debt fairly well, it is obvious that the
model with sovereign risk implies better forecasts of private consumption and government
consumption in particular, but also of the real exchange rate and the nominal interest rate.
The obtained fit of the basic model in some directions thus comes at the cost of infe-
rior forecasts in other directions. For example, large demand shocks may help to match
the dynamics of the real interest rate (as discussed below), but they imply bad forecasts
for consumption. The reason is that expected consumption repeatedly underpredicts actual
consumption if there are long sequences of unexpected positive demand shocks. The basic
model also generates large government consumption shocks (see Figure 3) in order to match
the dynamics of inflation and the nominal interest rate, which works through the inflation-
ary impact of expansionary fiscal shocks. However, this comes at the cost of bad forecasts
of government consumption.
20In the augmented model the hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 1% level in case of
two shocks while in the basic model it cannot be not rejected in case of five shocks.
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Figure 3: Estimated structural innovations with and without sovereign risk (percentage
points). Notes. The innovations are estimates implied by the Kalman smoother at the poste-
rior mean.
Table 3 reportsmean forecast errors (MFE) and rootmean squared forecast errors (RMSFE)
which were computed based on the one-step ahead forecasts.21 The RMSFE are useful to
judge the overall predictive performance of the two model versions. The MFE help to judge
whether any variable is repeatedly over- or underpredicted. The latter indicate that the ba-
sic model tends to underpredict domestic consumption, inflation and the real exchange rate,
but overpredicts government consumption. The mean forecast errors are however much
closer to zero in the augmented model, for almost all variables. Similarly, the RMSFE of the
augmented model are (significantly) smaller for almost all variables. As for the business
cycle moments, exceptions are in case of the MFE the interest rate and in case of the RMSFE
inflation and debt. We postpone the interpretation of these results to Section 4.2. In sum, the
model with sovereign risk is clearly preferable in terms of forecasting performance to the
21The formulas are MFE = T−1 ∑Tt=1 Ft and RMSFE =
√
T−1 ∑Tt=1 F
2
t , where Ft is the one-step ahead forecast
error.
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Figure 4: Observed data and one-step ahead forecasts from the models with and without
sovereign risk. Notes. Quarterly data, 1994:3-2008:2; one-step ahead forecasts are estimates
implied by the Kalman filter at the posterior mean; real variables aremeasured in percentage
deviations from a linear trend, nominal variables are demeaned and in annualized percent-
age terms.
underlying basic model.
4.1.6 Default premia and effective interest rates
Why does the model with sovereign risk provide a significantly better fit to the observed
data or, conversely, why does the data clearly reject the basic model? In order to provide an
intuition, notice that combining equations (16) and (24) yields
εc,t − σcˆt = Et(εc,t+1 − σcˆt+1) + RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Etδ˜t+1
or, using that Etεc,t+1 = 0 and re-writing:
σ(Et cˆt+1 − cˆt) = RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Etδ˜t+1 − εc,t (37)
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Table 3: One-step ahead forecast errors.a
Mean forecast Root mean squared
error MFEb forecast error RMSFEc
With sov. risk No sov. risk With sov. risk No sov. risk
Output -0.00 0.00 0.75 3.66
Consumption 0.00 0.04 2.14 5.23
Inflation 0.05 0.08 13.26 8.90
Interest rate 0.12 0.11 8.96 30.33
Real exch. rate -0.02 0.40 8.97 18.91
Gov. consumption 0.00 -1.19 2.42 23.43
Domestic debt 0.03 -0.06 3.14 1.81
For. consumption 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.28
For. inflation -0.01 0.01 0.98 1.00
a The forecast errors Ft are computed as the difference between the observed variable Yt and its one-
step ahead forecast Y ft as Ft = Yt −Y
f
t , where Yt and Y
f
t are measured in percentage terms.
b The mean forecast errors are computed according to the formula MFE = T−1 ∑Tt=1 Ft.
c The mean squared forecast errors are computed according to the formula RMSFE =
√
T−1 ∑Tt=1 F
2
t .
Suppose that expected consumption growth Et cˆt+1 − cˆt shows “different” dynamics than
the expected real interest rate RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1. Indeed, according to both models, estimated
consumption growth was low in the first half of the sample whereas the real interest rate
was relatively high (compare Figure 5 and Figure 7). In principle, there are three ways in
which such dynamics could be reconciled with (37):
1. Suppose that Etδ˜t+1 = 0 for all t. Positive demand shocks εc,t could make (37) hold
if Et cˆt+1 − cˆt is temporarily low relative to RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1. For example, in the case of
a positive demand shock, households would save less even if the real interest rate is
high since they have a temporary preference for higher consumption.
2. Alternatively, set both Etδ˜t+1 = 0 and εc,t = 0 for all t. A relatively large value on the
inverse intertemporal substitution elasticity σ would increase the households’ prefer-
ences for a smooth consumption path, even if the real interest rate is not smooth.
3. Finally, with relatively small demand shocks and a moderate value of σ, a high ex-
pected default rate can balance (37). Households would invest less when the real in-
terest rate is high due to higher default fears, and vice versa.
A combination of all three explanations seems relevant for understanding our estimation
results. First, large demand shocks occur in the model without sovereign risk whereas the
model with sovereign risk requires much smaller shocks, as indicated by Figure 6, which
shows the smoothed demand shocks from both models. Second, the estimated value of σ
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Figure 5: Estimated expected consumption growth with and without sovereign risk (in per-
centage deviations from steady state). Notes. Expected consumption growth Et cˆt+1 − cˆt is
estimated using the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean.
is more than 25 times higher in the model without sovereign risk. And third, we conclude
from Figure 7 that default premia were relatively high before the monetary reforms in 2001
but they have declined since then. Therefore, the effective real interest rate net of default
risk RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 − Etδ˜t+1/(1 − δ¯) shows much smoother dynamics than the actual real
rate, which are easier to reconcile with the expected consumption growth.
4.1.7 Variance decomposition
The importance of alternative structural shocks in driving the variation of the observed
data as well as the (estimated) expected default rate is analyzed next. Table 4 reports their
unconditional posterior variance decomposition, distinguishing between economic shocks
and policy shocks.22
The results show that economic shocks are the main driving force of output, private con-
22The economic shocks are {εa, εc, εc∗ , επ∗ , εq} and the policy shocks are {εR, ετ , εg}.
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Table 4: Posterior variance decomposition of observed variables and estimated default rate.a
Output Cons. Inflation Int. rate Exch. rate Gov. cons. Dom. debt For. cons. For. infl. Default rate
With sovereign risk: economic shocks
Technology εa 98.9 83.0 35.6 36.6 10.1 0.0 26.8 0.0 0.0 33.8
Dom. demand εc 0.6 14.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
For. demand εc∗ 0.1 1.1 3.0 3.1 1.3 0.0 2.3 73.1 15.0 3.0
For. prices επ∗ 0.1 0.4 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 26.8 85.0 1.2
Exch. rate εq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Totalb 99.7 99.4 40.0 41.1 99.9 0.0 30.2 99.9 100.0 38.2
With sovereign risk: policy shocks
Int. rate εR 0.3 0.2 4.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.4
Gov. cons. εg 0.1 0.3 20.3 20.9 0.0 100.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 20.9
Fiscal policy ετ 0.0 0.0 35.6 36.6 0.0 0.0 28.9 0.0 0.0 39.5
For. debt share ε f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Totalb 0.4 0.5 60.1 48.9 0.0 100.0 69.8 0.0 0.0 61.8
No sovereign risk: economic shocks
Technology εa 4.4 0.5 30.4 22.0 2.4 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 –
Dom. demand εc 15.8 95.2 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –
For. demand εc∗ 45.5 2.8 43.6 31.5 47.0 0.0 19.6 73.2 15.0 –
For. prices επ∗ 17.1 1.0 17.2 12.4 17.5 0.0 3.0 26.8 85.0 –
Exch. rate εq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –
Total 82.8 99.5 92.1 66.6 97.5 0.0 24.3 100.0 100.0 –
No sovereign risk: policy shocks
Int. rate εR 3.3 0.4 2.8 29.7 1.7 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 –
Gov. cons. εg 13.9 0.1 5.2 3.7 0.7 100.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 –
Fiscal policy ετ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.4 0.0 0.0 –
For. debt share ε f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 –
Total 17.2 0.5 8.0 33.4 2.4 100.0 75.9 0.0 0.0 –
a Table entries refer to contribution to unconditional variance (in percent) at the posterior mean.
b Some of the totals do not sum up to 100% due to rounding errors.
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Figure 6: Estimated demand shocks εc,t with and without sovereign risk. Notes. The shocks
are estimates implied by the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean.
sumption and the real exchange rate in both versions of the model. However, overall the
economic shocks are more important in the model without sovereign risk. With sovereign
risk, about 50-60% of the variation in inflation and the nominal interest rate is attributed to
policy shocks, and here especially the fiscal policy shock ετ and the government consump-
tion shock εg, whereas the basic model does not assign a dominant role to those shocks. The
interest rate shock εR, on the other hand, becomes less important in explaining variation in
the nominal interest rate in the model with sovereign risk.
In terms of the driving forces of the expected default rate, it turns out that economic
shocks contribute 38% and policy shocks contribute 62% to its variation. Among the eco-
nomic shocks, technology shocks are again most important. Among the policy shocks, the
fiscal policy shocks contributes most variation, about 40%, whereas the government con-
sumption and the interest rate shock contribute about 21% and 1%, respectively. These
results indicate that a reduction in the volatility of policy shocks (especially fiscal shocks)
has helped to reduce the variability of expected default rates over time (compare Figures 3
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Figure 7: Estimated expected real interest rate (RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1), expected default rate (Etδ˜t+1)
and effective real interest rate (RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 − (1− δ¯)−1Etδ˜t+1). Notes. The variables are
estimates implied by the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean; the real interest rate and
the real effective interest rate are reported as quarterly percentage deviations from steady
state; the default rate is measured in absolute deviations (in percentage points) from its
steady state value.
and 7).
4.2 Counterfactual experiments and amplification of shocks
In this subsection we first present several counterfactual experiments in order to investigate
the importance of (and to gain intuition for) particular elements of the model in explaining
the dynamics of the model and hence the observed data. Moreover, we analyze the implica-
tions of alternative fiscal and monetary policies. Then we present the estimated impulse re-
sponse functions from the basic and the augmented model computed at the posterior mean
estimates of the structural parameters which here jointly differ across the two models. In all
cases, we compare the impulse responses of selected variables to a unitary negative technol-
ogy shock where the shock is normalized to have the estimated persistence from the model
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with sovereign risk in order to ensure comparability.23
4.2.1 Counterfactual experiments
All experiments are based on the estimated model with sovereign risk, which we refer to as
the benchmark model.24 We change one structural parameter at a time. In particular, (i) the
default elasticity Φ is set to zero, (ii) the degree of openness ϑ is set to zero, (iii) the foreign
debt share f¯ is set to zero, (iv) the inverse intertemporal substitution elasticity σ is set to
15.85, its posterior mean estimate in the basic model, (v) the fiscal feedback κ is doubled
and (vi) the monetary feedback απ is doubled. For expositional purposes, we first discuss
experiment (i), the model without sovereign risk, before we turn to the benchmark model
with sovereign risk.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses for experiments (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). When the
default elasticity Φ is set to zero (experiment (i), thick dashed line) there is no expected
default (i.e. Ricardian equivalence holds). The negative technology shock causes a rise in
intermediate goods firms’ marginal costs. The firms react by increasing prices, which leads
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Domestic consumption therefore falls, due to
international risk sharing and expenditure switching of domestic and foreign households,
and so does domestic output. The monetary authority reacts to higher inflation by increas-
ing the nominal interest rate. Government debt falls initially, due to the direct beneficial
exchange rate effect on foreign debt and the fact that government purchases of domestic
goods become cheaper due to the real appreciation. Thereafter, government debt shows a
persistent increase due to higher debt service obligations resulting from the higher nominal
interest rate.
Under sovereign risk (benchmark model, solid line) the real value of debt affects the
effective rate of return and thus alters those dynamics through various channels. As in case
(i), higher inflation leads to higher nominal interest rates and hence to higher debt service
obligations and debt. However, savings tend to be lower and current domestic consumption
tends to be higher than in case (i) due to the negative feedback from debt on its return
(see equations 24 and 26), spurring inflationary pressures. In order to contain inflation, the
central bank needs to increase the nominal interest rate by more than in case (i), which then
reduces the tendency of current domestic consumption to rise. Higher nominal rates in turn
23The parameter ρa is thus set to 0.91 in all models.
24We choose the augmented model as the benchmark since the basic model is clearly rejected by the data.
Moreover, the augmentedmodel allows analyzing the effects of foreign currency denominated debt and changes
of the policy parameters, both in the presence of sovereign risk.
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Figure 8: Estimated and counterfactual impulse responses due to a technology shock based
on the model with sovereign risk. Notes. Technology shock is normalized to 1%; esti-
mated impulse responses are calculated at the posterior mean and counterfactual impulse
responses are calculated by changing one parameter at a time; real variables are measured in
percentage deviations from steady state, nominal variables in absolute (annual) percentage
point deviations from steady state.
imply higher debt servicing costs, higher debt levels and thus increasing expected default
rates which tend to lower the expected return on debt and hence eventually lead to further
pressures on demand and inflation. Hence, the initial increase of inflation is amplified via
the negative feedback from debt on its return, pushing up nominal variables and debt.
In an open economy, demand and inflationary pressures are even larger due to the pres-
ence of the exchange rate channel. Here, the pressure on domestic current consumption
from the negative feedback from debt on its return feeds into pressures on the real exchange
rate due to international risk sharing (see equation 23). A real depreciation would lead to
expenditure switching of domestic households and increasing demand of foreign house-
holds for home goods. Moreover, domestic households would demand a higher nominal
wage since the price level of aggregate consumption rises due to higher prices of imported
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goods. Hence, in a open economy the central bank has to raise nominal interest rate by
more than in a closed economy in order to maintain the additional demand pressures from
depreciationary effects of the real exchange rate.
The benchmark model and experiment (i) show that the presence of sovereign risk in an
open economy may considerably amplify the fluctuations of nominal variables and debt. In
addition to improving the fit of the consumption Euler equation (see Section 4.1), includ-
ing sovereign risk into the model thus helps to account for the high volatility of nominal
variables and debt in the data. Put differently, it is not only the variability of the default
premium which helps to improve the fit of the model but also its pure existence.
In a closed economy (experiment (ii), dash-dotted line) the impact of the technology
shock on the inflation and the nominal interest rate is significantly muted, such that the
debt response and the reaction of the default rate are also smaller.25 The reason is that the
additional pressure on aggregate demand via the exchange rate is shut down in that case.
This experiment shows that the presence of sovereign risk also alters the dynamics of a
closed economy, but that the effects of sovereign risk are amplified in an open economy via
the exchange rate channel.
Similarly, without foreign debt (experiment (iii), solid line with dots) the increase in in-
flation, the nominal interest rate and debt is muted. Without foreign currency denominated
debt, the pressure on the real exchange rate does not trigger additional fears of default due
to fears of debt revaluation (see equations 24, 26 and 28). Moreover, the devaluating effect
of increases of domestic inflation on the stock of real debt is more pronounced if debt is
only denominated in domestic currency. Interestingly, the dynamics without foreign debt
are quantitatively more similar to the dynamics without sovereign risk (experiment i) than
to the benchmark model, for the given parameter values.
For high values of the inverse intertemporal substitution elasticity σ (experiment (iv),
bars) the response of consumption to an increase of the nominal interest rate is substantially
muted since households have strong preferences for a smooth consumption path. The ef-
fectiveness of high nominal rates to maintain pressures on aggregate demand is reduced
such that higher nominal rates are required. Higher nominal rates in turn imply higher
actual debt service obligations and hence expected default rates, explaining the amplified
responses for high values of σ.
A priori, it is not clear which policy is superior in terms of stabilizing nominal variables,
25Notice that the definitions of the nominal depreciation rate and the real exchange rate become meaningless
for ϑ = 0.
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debt and expected default rates, stronger fiscal or stronger monetary feedbacks. A stronger
fiscal feedback is expected to lead to a faster reduction in government debt at the cost of
approaching critical tax levels. The impact on the expected default rate is therefore ambigu-
ous. A stronger monetary feedback may better contain demand pressures, but they imply
higher actual debt service obligations and hence fears of default.
The results reported in Figure 9 show that due to an increase in the fiscal feedback coef-
ficient κ from 0.53 to 1.06 (experiment (v), solid line with dots) the reduction in government
debt via higher taxes occurs faster. The increase in the expected default rate is therefore
weaker, which leads to lower demand pressure and inflation and thus a smaller increase in
the nominal interest rate. Under a higher monetary feedback, i.e. an increase of απ from
2.1 to 4.2 (experiment (vi), solid-dotted line) inflation expectations are contained. Hence,
demand pressures do not feed into higher inflation which reduces the need for the central
bank to raise actual nominal interest rates.26 However, there is no reduction in the response
of the default rate but rather a slight increase since the devaluating effect of inflation on the
real stock of debt is smaller.
We conclude that the destabilizing dynamics of sovereign risk discussed by Blanchard
(2005) and Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2010) do have practical relevance. However, both
more active monetary and higher fiscal debt feedbacks on taxes can have stabilizing effects
on nominal interest rates, inflation and government debt. A more active stance of monetary
policy, by maintaining inflation expectations, reduces the need for high nominal interest
rates. Default premia can however be larger under more active monetary policy whereas
they unambiguously decline with higher fiscal feedbacks. Hence, if an economy is subject
to sovereign risk solid fiscal policy is an effective device for stabilizing nominal interest
rates, inflation and debt, and the clearly preferable policy for stabilizing expected default
rates.
4.2.2 Amplification of shocks
After analyzing particular elements of the model in isolation, we now discuss the estimated
impulse response functions from both models computed at the posterior mean estimates of
the structural parameters which now jointly differ across models. The dashed line in Fig-
ure 10 shows the impulse responses due to a unitary negative technology shock of the basic
model without sovereign risk. As above, the negative technology shock causes a rise in in-
flation and an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Domestic consumption and output fall.
26The same holds in a closed economy setting, not reported here.
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Figure 9: Estimated and counterfactual impulse responses due to a technology shock based
on the model with sovereign risk, policy feedbacks. Notes. Technology shock is normalized
to 1%; estimated impulse responses are calculated at the posterior mean and counterfactual
impulse responses are calculated by changing one parameter at a time; real variables are
measured in percentage deviations from steady state, nominal variables in absolute (annual)
percentage point deviations from steady state.
The monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate, government debt falls initially
and then shows a persistent increase due to higher debt service obligations resulting from
the higher interest rate.
Under sovereign risk (solid line), the real value of debt affects the effective rate of return,
as discussed above. In particular, the amplification of the responses of inflation, the nomi-
nal interest rate, domestic debt and the expected default rate can mainly be attributed to the
presence of sovereign risk, i.e. to the fact that Φ > 0. The different responses of consump-
tion, output and the real exchange rate seem to be mainly driven by the lower value of the
inverse intertemporal substitution elasticity σ. A low value for σ implies a more pronounced
response of consumption to movements in the real effective interest rate. However, the ef-
fect on the real exchange rate is muted since variations in domestic consumption only feed
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Figure 10: Estimated impulse responses due to technology shocks in the models with and
without sovereign risk. Notes. Technology shock is normalized to 1% and to have persis-
tence as estimated in the model with sovereign risk; impulse responses are calculated at
the posterior mean; real variables are measured in percentage deviations from steady state,
nominal variables in absolute (annual) percentage point deviations from steady state.
into small variations of the real exchange rate, given the low value of σ (as can be seen from
equations 16 and 23). Finally, the higher share of imports tends to amplify both the effects of
sovereign risk on nominal variables and government debt and the response of consumption.
In sum, comparing these results to the impulse responses in Figures 8 and 9 shows that
the differences between the dynamics of the estimated basic and the estimated augmented
model are due to the fact that all parameters differ across estimated models but not from the
addition of sovereign risk in isolation.
4.3 Sensitivity checks
As a final step of the analysis, we estimate alternative versions of the benchmark model
with sovereign risk. Table 5 compares the parameter estimates. First, instead of estimating
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the standard deviation of the measurement error on the real effective exchange rate σq, it
is calibrated to 0.05, i.e. its prior mean.27 The estimated inverse intertemporal substitution
elasticity σ, the degree of openness ϑ, and the degree of price stickiness φ change slightly,
but the remaining estimates remain almost unaffected.
Second, an exchange rate stabilization term is introduced in the monetary authority’s
reaction function. The reason is that the CBRT onlymoved to explicit inflation targetingwith
the economic reforms introduced in 2001. Before that, it pursued a crawling peg exchange
rate targeting policy (see Gormez and Yilmaz, 2007). We attempt to capture this fact by the
following modification of (4):
RH,t
RH
=
(πt
π
)απ (qt
q
)αq
exp(εR,t),
where again εR,t ∼ NID(0, σ2R) and the feedback αq indicates the strength of the monetary
authority’s reaction to exchange rate movements.28 As the inflation feedback, the exchange
rate feedback is assumed to be non-negative, i.e. the monetary authority reacts to a real
depreciation by increasing the nominal interest rate.29 The exchange rate feedback is moti-
vated by Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2007) observation that many central banks in small open
economies do target exchange rate movements via a Taylor rule. The estimation results in
Table 5 indicate that the exchange rate feedback is fairly large, but the marginal likelihood
does not provide support for this specification, compared to the benchmark model. Impor-
tantly, the estimates of the remaining model parameters change very little.30
Further, we add external habit formation in consumption to the estimated model, like
in Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2007) or Justiniano and Preston (2010). That is, the
(domestic and foreign) households’ preferences are modified accordingly:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
exp(εc,t)
(ct − hc˘t−1)
1−σ
1− σ
−
n
1+η
t
1+ η
)
where h ∈ (0, 1) and c˘t−1 denotes aggregate domestic consumption, which is taken as exoge-
27This exercise shows whether, if we restrict the estimation procedure in one dimension (here measurement
error) where there is some discrepancy between the model and the data, first, the model can still explain the
data, i.e. whether we obtain convergence in the mode maximization step, and second, whether estimation of
the restricted model leads to reasonable estimates of the structural parameters and remaining shock variances.
28The exchange rate target is assumed to be consistent with steady state values.
29A U(0, 10) prior is applied similar to the prior for απ .
30Alternatively, we included a real exchange rate depreciation term (qt+1 − qt) in the Taylor rule with prior
N (0.5, 0.52) on its reaction coefficient. However, the reaction coefficient was not identified by the estimation.
Moreover, we included the output gap (in deviations from steady state output) with prior N (0.5, 0.52) on its
reaction coefficient into the Taylor rule. The estimated reaction coefficient is close to zero (0.03). All other
parameter values and the marginal likelihood remain virtually unchanged.
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Table 5: Sensitivity of parameter estimates.a
Benchmark Smaller Taylor Habit Smaller
Parameter Definition Priorb model meas. errorc exch. rate formation debt shocksd
σ Inv. elast. of intertemp. subst. U(0, 20) 0.59 0.43 0.58 1.24 1.33
h Degree of habit formation U(0, 1) – – – 0.58 –
φ Calvo price stickiness U(0, 1) 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.54 0.64
ϑ Degree of openness U(0, 1) 0.42 0.57 0.42 0.14 0.12
απ Taylor rule inflation response U(0, 10) 2.10 2.13 2.12 1.80 1.58
αq Taylor rule ex. rate response U(0, 10) – – 0.24 – –
κ Tax rule debt response U(κL, 10)e 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.41
Φ Default elasticity U(0, 10) 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.18
ρa AR(1) technology U(0, 1) 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.97
ρg AR(1) gov. consumption U(0, 1) 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.28
ρ f AR(1) foreign debt ratio U(0, 1) 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.93
σa Std. dev. technology shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
σg Std. dev. gov. consumption shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
σf Std. dev. foreign debt ratio shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.26 –
στ Std. dev. fiscal policy shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07
σR Std. dev. interest rate shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
σc Std. dev. demand shocks IG(0.05,∞) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.05
σq Std. dev. meas. error on REERt IG(0.05,∞) 0.09 – 0.09 0.11 0.11
log p(YT|Mi) Log marginal data densityf 873.67 849.86 870.47 880.67 854.00
a The estimation results are based on 500,000 accepted draws from the RWM sampler, dropping the first 250,000 draws.
b U(a, b) refers to the continuous uniform distribution with lower bound a and upper bound b; IG(c, d) refers to the inverse gamma distribution with mean c and
std. deviation d.
c For the specification with smaller measurement errors, the standard deviation σq is calibrated to 0.05.
d For the specification with smaller debt shocks, the standard deviation σf is calibrated to 0.15.
e The lower bound is κL = 1− β(1− δ¯), which ensures that steady state domestic debt bH/π is positive such that Φ > 0 (see Appendix C).
f The marginal data density is estimated using Geweke’s (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator.
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nous by the individual households.31 The first-order conditions for (domestic and foreign)
consumption become
λt = exp(εc,t) (ct − hct−1)
−σ
λ∗t = (c
∗
t − hc
∗
t−1)
−σ
where the equilibrium conditions ct = c˘t and c∗t = c˘
∗
t have been imposed for all t. The intro-
duction of habit formation is motivated by the idea that, if this is a salient feature of the data
(see, for example, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani, 2007; Smets andWouters, 2007; Jus-
tiniano and Preston, 2010), the associated modification of the consumption Euler equation
may alter the importance of sovereign risk in explaining macroeconomic dynamics as well.
The estimation results in Table 5 show that, although h is fairly large with an estimated
value of 0.58 and the marginal data density improves by 7 log points, the estimated default
elasticity and the policy coefficients remain sufficiently close to the baseline estimates.32 The
default elasticity drops from 0.25 to 0.19.
Next, the largest estimated standard deviation (of the debt issuance shock) σf is cali-
brated to 0.15, i.e. half of the benchmark estimate. This shock only has an impact on the
division among domestic and foreign debt, but no effect on the real variables and the esti-
mated default rate (see Table 4). With a smaller value of its standard deviation the model
is restricted to explain more variation in domestic debt by the remaining structural shocks
via cross-equation restrictions. The estimated persistence of government consumption de-
creases and there are also some significant changes in the remaining estimates compared
to the benchmark case (notably σ, φ, ϑ and απ). Most importantly, however, the estimated
default elasticity of 0.18 still indicates a highly debt-elastic default rate.
We have also attempted to estimate the benchmarkmodel by constrainedmaximum like-
lihood (ML), where we restricted the model parameters on their theoretically feasible range
according to the domains in Table 1. It turned out that ML estimation was only feasible (in
terms of convergence of the optimizer) when we calibrated the degree of price stickiness φ
to its benchmark value of 0.19. The estimation results for the remaining parameters show
that only σ and ϑ change significantly to 0.26 and 0.74, respectively, whereas the other pa-
rameters remain close to the benchmark values. Again, the default elasticity is estimated to
be highly debt-elastic (with a value of 0.23).
31A U(0, 1) prior is elicited on h consistent with its theoretical domain.
32We have not introduced habit formation in the basic model without sovereign risk since we here faced
convergence problems in the mode optimization step.
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Finally, the estimated expected default rates from all estimated versions of the model are
compared in Figure 11. The results are very similar across models, the only exceptions being
the models with habit formation and smaller debt issuance shocks for which the default rate
is somewhat less volatile, smaller during the first half of the sample and larger during the
second half. However, even in those two cases the estimated default rate remains close to the
estimate from the benchmark model. Setting the discount factor β to alternative values of
0.97 and 0.999 leaves all the estimation results virtually unchanged. The standard deviation
of the model-implied default premium is only affected at the third significant digit when
changing βwhile the correlation with the default premium for β = 0.99 is one in both cases.
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Figure 11: Estimated expected default rate (Etδ˜t+1) according to alternative models. Notes.
The default rate is the estimate implied by the Kalman smoother at the posterior mean.
5 Conclusions
We set up a mostly standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open
economy where rigidities in domestic producer prices are the only nominal friction. A per-
ceived possibility of sovereign debt default implies a time-varying default premium on gov-
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ernment bonds which depends on the stock of real total debt and which we include into this
otherwise standard NOEM model. We outline two main variants of the model which differ
only with respect to the inclusion of the expected default rate. More specifically, the model
without sovereign risk is a special case of the general model with sovereign risk where the
parameter on the expected default rate in the Euler equation for government bonds is re-
stricted to equal zero.
Using Bayesian estimation methods we find that the estimated expected default rate is
highly debt-elastic and depends on fiscal policy, indicating that default fears are a relevant
concern. Model comparisons clearly support the model with expected default rate as com-
pared the standard New Keynesian small open economy model where the level of debt is
irrelevant for the dynamics of nominal variables. We find that in the latter, large shocks
are required in order to reconcile the observed dynamics of the nominal interest rate, the
real exchange rate, government debt and aggregate demand. Accounting for sovereign risk
leads to stronger internal propagation and better forecasting performance. In terms of policy
implications, counterfactual experiments show that solid fiscal policy leads to less volatile
debt and inflation dynamics, by reducing expected default rates. On the other hand, more
active monetary policy is also an effective stabilization device for inflation and debt, but it
does not reduce expected default rates.
Finally, there is empirical evidence that the relationship between government debt and
default premia may contain non-linear elements (see, for example, Bayoumi, Goldstein, and
Woglom, 1995) such that the linear estimation approach followed in this chapter provides
only an incomplete picture of this relationship. However, non-linear estimationmethods are
still not readily available. They might become a viable avenue in future research. Moreover,
the linear model seems to provide a reasonable description of expected default rates (see the
EMBIG Turkey spread in Figure 2).
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A Data Definitions
This appendix provides details on data definitions, data sources and the construction of the foreign
variables. All data are seasonally adjusted and the consumer price index is used to construct real
variables with base year 1998, if they are only available in nominal terms from the original source.
The domestic variable definitions and their sources are as follows:
• GDPt: Real gross domestic product, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
• CONSt: Real private consumption expenditure, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
• GOVt: Real government consumption expenditure, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
• DEBTt: Domestic debt position of the treasury, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
• INTt: Annual net interest rate for 3-month treasury bills, constructed from data obtained from
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey; if 3-month bills were not issued in some quarter,
we use the closest maturity available.
• INFt: Annualized rate of change of the quarterly CPI, State Institute of Statistics Turkey.
• REERt: Real CPI-based effective exchange rate, OECD main economic indicators.
The foreign variables are constructed from euro area real private consumption and the annual
inflation rate according to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices obtained from the Area-Wide
Model database (Fagan, Henry, and Mestre, 2005), and real U.S. personal consumption and the CPI-
based U.S. inflation rate (all urban sample, all items) obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Aggregate foreign consumption CONS∗t and foreign inflation INF
∗
t are computed accord-
ing to the trade weights in the basket targeted by the Turkish central bank during the exchange rate
targeting period (see Gormez and Yilmaz, 2007). That is, the euro area obtains a weight of 0.77 and
the U.S. obtains a weight of 1.
B Steady State Properties
In this appendix we derive a partial solution for the non-stochastic steady state of the model, which
is sufficient for its implementation. We take as given the steady state interest rate RH = R¯H , steady
state marginal costs mc = mc, the average foreign inflation CPI rate π¯∗, the average domestic CPI
inflation rate π = π¯, and the shares sc = s¯c and sg = s¯g. Furthermore, the steady state is assumed
to satisfy the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition, i.e. the steady state real exchange rate equals
unity (q = 1). While usually not taken seriously as a short-term proposition, empirical evidence
supports the usefulness of PPP as a long-run anchor for real exchange rates (Rogoff, 1996).33 In order
to obtain a well-defined equilibrium, we set the values of δ¯, mc, π¯∗, π¯X , c¯∗, g¯ and ξ accordingly, as
follows.
First, the process for productivity implies that
(1− ρa) log a = 0
33In particular, the estimated half-life of deviations from PPP in OECD countries is about three years (see
Abuaf and Jorion, 1996).
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or a = 1. Similarly, the remaining stochastic processes imply that g = g¯ and f = f¯ . The foreign VAR
process implies that
(I −Φ1∗ −Φ2∗ −Φ3∗ −Φ4∗)
[
log c∗
logπ∗
]
= (I −Φ1∗ −Φ2∗ −Φ3∗ −Φ4∗)
[
log c¯∗
log π¯∗
]
and therefore, assuming stability of the VAR such that (I −Φ1∗ −Φ2∗ −Φ3∗ −Φ4∗) is non-singular,
c∗ = c¯∗ and π∗ = π¯∗ can be taken as given.
Second, the central bank is assumed to achieve its target rate of nominal depreciation in the
steady state, i.e.
πX = π¯X = π/π¯∗.
Therefore, we can take π = π¯ = π¯Xπ¯∗ as given.
Third, the steady state interest rate satisfies
RH = R¯H =
π¯
β
(
1− δ¯
)
such that δ¯ is given by
δ¯ = 1−
π¯/R¯H
β
< 1.
Fourth, the intermediate goods firms’ first-order conditions for price setting imply that
mc =
ǫ− 1
ǫ
so we can take mc = mc as given by calibrating ǫ accordingly.
Fifth, we set the constant ξ (which depends on initial endowments) such that q = 1. In order to
see this, notice that the international risk sharing condition yields
λ∗ = ξqλ
or, substituting out λ∗ = c¯∗−σ and λ = c−σ and solving for q:
q =
1
ξ
( c
c¯∗
)σ
.
In order to obtain an expression for the steady state real exchange rate in terms of the given values
for sc and sg, solve the market clearing equation in steady state for sc∗ :
yH = (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ c + ϑ∗q
1
1−ϑ c∗ + g
or
sc∗ =
1− (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ s¯c − s¯g
q
1
1−ϑ ϑ∗
.
Therefore, we have
q =
1
ξ
(
s¯c
sc∗
)σ
=
1
ξ
 q 11−ϑ ϑ∗ s¯c
1− (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ s¯c − s¯g
σ .
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In order to fix q = 1, we can set the constant ξ accordingly:
ξ =
(
ϑ∗ s¯c
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
)σ
.
Finally, we need to fix values c¯∗ and g¯ in order to match sc = s¯c and sg = s¯g. For q = 1 it follows
from the international risk sharing condition that
c = ξ1/σc∗ = ξ1/σ c¯∗.
Furthermore, the steady state real wage rate is equal to steady state marginal costs,
w = mc.
Then the domestic households’ first-order condition for labor supply implies that
cσnη = w = mc
or
yH =
(
mc
cσ
)1/η
=
(
mc/ξ
c¯∗σ
)1/η
since yH = n in the steady state. We then obtain the desired values for c¯∗ and g¯ from
c¯∗ = c∗ = sc∗yH = sc∗
(
mc/ξ
c¯∗σ
)1/η
or
c¯∗ = (mc/ξ)
1/σ
η/σ+1
(
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
ϑ∗
) η/σ
η/σ+1
and
g¯ = g = sgyH = s¯g
(
mc/ξ
c¯∗σ
)1/η
or
g¯ =
s¯g (mc/ξ)
1/σ
η/σ+1(
1−(1−ϑ)s¯c−s¯g
ϑ∗
) 1
η/σ+1
.
In the implementation of the model, we need to verify that c¯∗ > 0 and g¯ > 0.
In addition, we derive some steady state expressions which are used in the log-linearization step
below. The debt issuance rule implies that(since f = f¯ ):
bF
RF
= f¯
bH
RH
or
bF
π∗
= f¯
bH
π
.
where we have used the domestic and foreign households’ consumption Euler equations in steady
state:
RH =
π
β (1− δ)
, RF =
π∗
β (1− δ)
.
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Furthermore, steady state total debt is defined by
b = bH/π + bF/π∗.
C Log-Linearization
In this appendix we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state.
In a neighborhood of the steady state, the rational expectations solution of the model is then approx-
imated by the solution of the linearized system.
1. First-order condition for domestic consumption:
λt = exp(εc,t)c−σt .
Taking logs and subtracting steady state values yields the log-linearized version:
logλt = εc,t − σ log ct
logλt − logλ = εc,t − σ (log ct − log c)
λˆt = εc,t − σcˆt.
2. First-order condition for labor supply:
n
η
t = λtwt.
Similarly as above, taking logs and subtracting steady state values yields the log-linearized
version:
ηnˆt = λˆt + wˆt.
3. First-order condition for foreign consumption:
λ∗t = c
∗−σ
t .
The log-linearized version is
λˆ∗t = −σcˆ
∗
t .
4. Domestic production:
yH,tvt = atnt.
It can be shown that, in a neighborhood of the steady state, the price dispersion term vt =∫ 1
0
(
PiH,t
Pt
)−ǫ
di is equal to zero up to a first-order approximation (Yun, 1996), i.e. vˆt = 0. Log-
linearizing thus yields
yˆH,t = aˆt + nˆt.
5. Labor demand function:
wt =
PH,t
Pt
mctat.
53
Since PH,t/Pt = q
ϑ
ϑ−1
t , the log-linearized version is
m̂ct =
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt + wˆt − aˆt.
6. Domestic inflation:
Following (Yun, 1996), log-linearizing the intermediate goods producers’ first-order condition
for pricing yields the open economy Phillips curve
πˆH,t =
(1− φ) (1− φβ)
φ
m̂ct + βEtπˆH,t+1.
7. CPI inflation:
πt = πH,t(qt/qt−1)
ϑ
1−ϑ .
The log-linearized version is
πˆt = πˆH,t +
ϑ
1− ϑ
(qˆt − qˆt−1).
8. International risk sharing:
λ∗t = ξqtλt,
where ξ is a constant which depends on initial endowments. Taking logs and subtracting
steady state values yields
λˆ∗t = qˆt + λˆt.
9. Taylor rule:
RH,t
RH
=
(πt
π
)απ
exp(εR,t).
Taking logs yields the log-linearized version
RˆH,t = αππˆt + εR,t.
10. Market clearing:
yH,t = (1− ϑ) q
ϑ
1−ϑ
t ct + ϑ
∗q
1
1−ϑ
t c
∗
t + gt.
The market clearing condition can be log-linearized as follows:
yH yˆH,t = (1− ϑ) c
(
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt + cˆt
)
+ ϑ∗c∗
(
1
1− ϑ
qˆt + cˆ
∗
t
)
+ ggˆt
= (1− ϑ) ccˆt + ϑ∗c∗ cˆ∗t +
(
ϑc +
ϑ∗
1− ϑ
c∗
)
qˆt + ggˆt
or
yˆH,t = (1− ϑ) sc cˆt + ϑ∗sc∗ cˆ∗t +
(
ϑsc +
ϑ∗
1− ϑ
sc∗
)
qˆt + sg gˆt.
where sc = c/yH , sg = g/yH and sc∗ = c∗/yH denote the shares of domestic consumption,
government consumption and foreign consumption over domestic output. In steady state, we
have (see Appendix B)
sc∗ =
1− (1− ϑ) sc − sg
ϑ∗
.
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We take sc = s¯c and sg = s¯g as given so that
yˆH,t = (1− ϑ) s¯c cˆt +
[
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
]
cˆ∗t
+
(
ϑs¯c +
1− (1− ϑ) s¯c − s¯g
1− ϑ
)
qˆt + s¯g gˆt.
11. Debt issuance
Xt
BF,t
RF,t
= ft
BH,t
RH,t
.
In real terms:
qt
bF,t
RF,t
= ft
bH,t
RH,t
.
Taking logs and subtracting steady state values yields
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t = fˆt + bˆH,t − RˆH,t.
12. Total debt:
bt = (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) /Pt
= bH,t−1π
−1
t + qtbF,t−1π
∗−1
t .
A first-order Taylor expansion around the steady state yields
bt − b =
1
π
(bH,t−1 − bH)−
bH
π2
(πt − π)
+
bF
π∗
(qt − q) +
1
π∗
(bF,t−1 − bF)−
bF
π∗2
(π∗t − π
∗)
or
bbˆt =
bH
π
(
bˆH,t−1 − πˆt
)
+
bF
π∗
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)
.
Using b = bH/π + bF/π∗ and bF/π∗ = f¯ (bH/π) (see Appendix B):(
1+ f¯
)
bˆt = bˆH,t−1 − πˆt + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)
.
13. Government budget:
BH,t
RH,t
+ Xt
BF,t
RF,t
+ Ptτt = PH,tgt + BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1,
where
Ptτt = κ (BH,t−1 + XtBF,t−1) + Pt exp(ετ,t).
In real terms:
bH,t
RH,t
+ qt
bF,t
RF,t
+ κ
(
bH,t−1π
−1
t + qtbF,t−1π
∗−1
t
)
+ exp(ετ,t)
=
PH,t
Pt
gt + bH,t−1π
−1
t + qtbF,t−1π
∗−1
t
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or, substituting out bt = bH,t−1π−1t + qtbF,t−1π
∗−1
t and PH,t/Pt = q
ϑ
ϑ−1
t :
bH,t
RH,t
+ qt
bF,t
RF,t
= q
ϑ
ϑ−1
t gt + (1− κ)bt − exp(ετ,t).
In steady state, we have
bH
RH
+
bF
RF
= g + (1− κ)b
or, using RH = πβ(1−δ) , RF =
π∗
β(1−δ) , b = bH/π + bF/π
∗ and bF/π∗ = f¯ (bH/π):
bH
π
=
g(1+ f¯ )−1
κ + β (1− δ)− 1
.
The budget constraint can then be log-linearized as follows:
bH
RH
(
bˆH,t − RˆH,t
)
+
bF
RF
(
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t
)
= g
(
gˆt −
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt
)
+ (1− κ)bbˆt − ετ,t
or, substituting out steady state values,
bH
π
β (1− δ)
[
bˆH,t − RˆH,t + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t
)]
= g
(
gˆt −
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt
)
+
bH
π
(1− κ)(1+ f¯ )bˆt − ετ,t.
Dividing through by bHπ β (1− δ) yields
bˆH,t − RˆH,t + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t
)
−
(1− κ)(1+ f¯ )
β (1− δ)
bˆt
=
g
bH
π β (1− δ)
(
gˆt −
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt
)
−
1
bH
π β (1− δ)
ετ,t.
or, using bHπ =
g(1+ f¯ )−1
κ+β(1−δ)−1 and normalizing the fiscal policy shock ετ,t such that the normalized
shock has variance σ2τ :
bˆH,t − RˆH,t + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t − RˆF,t
)
−
(1− κ)(1+ f¯ )
β
(
1− δ¯
) bˆt
=
κ + β
(
1− δ¯
)
− 1
β
(
1− δ¯
)
(1+ f¯ )−1
(
gˆt −
ϑ
1− ϑ
qˆt
)
− ετ,t.
Recall that we take δ = δ¯ as given.
14. Domestic Euler equation:
λt = RH,tβEt
[
(1− δt+1)λt+1π
−1
t+1
]
.
Defining Ξt = 1− δt, the log-linearized version is
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 + EtΞ̂t+1.
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A first-order Taylor expansion of Ξt at the steady state furthermore yields (where we use
bF
π∗ =
f¯ bHπ ):
Ξt = Ξ−
(
∂δt(·)
∂bt
|bt=b
) π
−1 (bH,t−1 − bH)− bHπ
−2 (πt − π)
+π∗−1 (bF,t−1 − bF) + bFπ
∗−1(qt − 1)
−bFπ
∗−2 (π∗t − π
∗)

= Ξ−
(
∂δt(·)
∂bt
|bt=b
) bHπ
−1bˆH,t−1 − bHπ
−1πˆt
+bFπ
∗−1bˆF,t−1 + bFπ
∗−1qˆt
−bFπ
∗−1πˆ∗t

= Ξ−
(
∂δt(·)
∂bt
|bt=b
)(
bH
π
) [
bˆH,t−1 − πˆt + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)]
or, since Ξ = 1− δ:
Ξ̂t = −
bH/π
1− δ
(
∂δt(·)
∂bt
|bt=b
) [
bˆH,t−1 − πˆt + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)]
= −Φ
[
bˆH,t−1 − πˆt + f¯
(
qˆt + bˆF,t−1 − πˆ
∗
t
)]
= −Φ
(
1+ f¯
)
bˆt.
The log-linearized default probability is
δδˆt = −ΞΞ̂t = Φ (1− δ)
(
1+ f¯
)
bˆt
or, in absolute deviations from steady state, taking δ = δ¯ as given:
δ˜t = Φ
(
1− δ¯
)
(1+ f¯ )bˆt.
Hence, we obtain the following log-linearized consumption Euler equation:
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 −Φ
(
1+ f¯
)
Et bˆt+1
= Etλˆt+1 + RˆH,t − Etπˆt+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Et δ˜t+1.
15. Foreign Euler equation:
λ∗t = RF,tβEt
[
(1− δt+1)λ
∗
t+1π
∗−1
t+1
]
.
Similarly as above, the log-linearized version is
λˆ∗t = Etλˆ
∗
t+1 + RˆF,t − Etπˆ
∗
t+1 −
1
1− δ¯
Et δ˜t+1.
16. Productivity shock:
log at = ρa log at−1 + εa,t.
Since a = 1, the log-linearized version is
log at − log a = ρa (log at−1 − log a) + εa,t
aˆt = ρa aˆt−1 + εa,t.
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17. Government goods purchases:
log(gt/g¯) = ρg log(gt−1/g¯) + εg,t.
Since g = g¯, the log-linearized version is
gˆt = ρg gˆt−1 + εg,t.
18. Foreign debt share:
log( ft/ f¯ ) = ρ f log( ft−1/ f¯ ) + ε f ,t.
Since f = f¯ , the log-linearized version is
fˆt = ρ f fˆt−1 + ε f ,t.
19. Foreign variables:[
log c∗t
logπ∗t
]
= (I −Φ1∗ −Φ2∗ −Φ3∗ −Φ4∗)
[
log c¯∗
log π¯∗
]
+ Φ1∗
[
log c∗t−1
logπ∗t−1
]
+Φ2∗
[
log c∗t−2
logπ∗t−2
]
+ Φ3∗
[
log c∗t−3
logπ∗t−3
]
+ Φ4∗
[
log c∗t−4
logπ∗t−4
]
+
[
vc∗ ,t
vπ∗,t
]
,
where
[vc∗ ,t, vπ∗ ,t]
′ ∼ NID(0,Σ∗).
Since c∗ = c¯∗ and π∗ = π¯∗, the log-linearized version is[
cˆ∗t
πˆ∗t
]
= Φ1∗
[
cˆ∗t−1
πˆ∗t−1
]
+ Φ2∗
[
cˆ∗t−2
πˆ∗t−2
]
+Φ3∗
[
cˆ∗t−3
πˆ∗t−3
]
+ Φ4∗
[
cˆ∗t−4
πˆ∗t−4
]
+
[
vc∗,t
vπ∗ ,t
]
.
Our identifying assumption is that foreign consumption affects foreign inflation within a quarter
but not vice versa. Thus, we apply a recursive Cholesky identification scheme: Σ∗ = C∗C′∗, where C∗
is a non-singular lower triangular matrix. Then we can write the identified foreign VAR process as
follows:
C−1∗
[
cˆ∗t
πˆ∗t
]
= C−1∗ Φ1∗
[
cˆ∗t−1
πˆ∗t−1
]
+ C−1∗ Φ2∗
[
cˆ∗t−2
πˆ∗t−2
]
+C−1∗ Φ3∗
[
cˆ∗t−3
πˆ∗t−3
]
+ C−1∗ Φ4∗
[
cˆ∗t−4
πˆ∗t−4
]
+
[
εc∗,t
επ∗,t
]
,
where
[εc∗,t, επ∗,t]
′ ∼ NID(0, I),
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or, in simultaneous equations form (since C−1∗ is a lower triangular matrix):
ρcc0∗ cˆ
∗
t = ρ
cc
1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
cπ
1∗ πˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
cc
2∗ cˆ
∗
t−2 + ρ
cπ
2∗ πˆ
∗
t−2
+ρcc3∗ cˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
cπ
3∗ πˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
cc
4∗ cˆ
∗
t−4 + ρ
cπ
4∗ πˆ
∗
t−4 + εc∗,t
ρππ0∗ πˆ
∗
t + ρ
πc
0∗ cˆ
∗
t = ρ
ππ
1∗ πˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
πc
1∗ cˆ
∗
t−1 + ρ
ππ
2∗ πˆ
∗
t−2 + ρ
πc
2∗ cˆ
∗
t−2
+ρππ3∗ πˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
πc
3∗ cˆ
∗
t−3 + ρ
ππ
4∗ πˆ
∗
t−4 + ρ
πc
4∗ cˆ
∗
t−4 + επ∗,t.
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